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LEGAL ASPECTS OF PUBLIC SCHOOL
TEACHER NEGOTIATING AND
PARTICIPATING IN CONCERTED

ACTIVITIES*
By REYNOLDS

C. SEITZ**

As a preface to the discussion in this article, it seems apppropriate to comment briefly upon the status of the industrial worker as
regards his effort to join labor organizations and bargain collectively. After some early struggles in England and America in the
1700's and 1800's during which such endeavors were condemned by
the courts and sometimes the legislatures as illegal conspiracies and
later illegal torts, the industrial worker received through statute
and judicial decision very substantial support for his effort to join
labor organizations and bargain collectively and to use concerted
activities in support of his economic welfare. This was surely most
evident at least from the middle 1930's after the impetus given by
the passage of the Wagner Act creating the National Labor Relations Board. The basic philosophy supporting the sanctioning of
such rights was a belief that such protection would significantly
contribute to industrial peace.
The push in the public employee field to join employee organizations whose goals are the betterment of employment conditions
has been gaining momentum since the end of World War II. Such
employees have not, however, automatically been given the same
rights as industrial workers. Hurdles have been erected by judicial
decisions and in some instances by legislative attitudes.
A hurdle which exists in the form of legislation' and judicial de* The author reserves the right to use this material in other publications.
**Dean and Professor of Law, (Sept. 1953 to June 1965-Professor of Law to
present), Marquette University Law School, Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Specialist
in Labor and School Law; experienced labor abritrator on panels of American
Arbitration Association, Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and Wisconsin Employment Relations Board; member Committee on Government Employee Relations of Labor Law Section of American Bar Association; member
National Academy of Abritrators; formerly assistant to the superintendent of
public schools in Omaha and St. Louis; senior attorney, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.; labor relations attorney, 'ontgomery Ward
and Co., Chicago; executive, Chicago Daily News; associate professor, Northwestern University. President, National Organization on Legal Problems of
Education, 1958-59 and 1959-60. Editor of volume "Law and the School Principal"; editor in chief, NOLPE School Law Newsletter; frequent writer and
lecturer on School Law.
1 Code of Ala. Tit. 55, §§317 (1)-317(4) (Supp. 1957) ; Ga. Code Ann. §§54-909,
54-9923 (1961) ; N.C. Gen. Stat. §§95-97-95-100 (Supp. 1959) ; Va. Code §§40.6540.67 (1950).
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cision 2 but which is fast disappearing in most jurisdictions is the
denial of the right to join an employee organization or Union on the
ground of inconsistency with government employment. To the extent that this attitude still exists, it would seem possible to challenge it on First Amendment constitutional grounds. It is difficult
to understand why such outlook is not an unconstitutional interference with the right of freedom to assemble.
A much more usual hurdle 3 today is the denial of the opportunity to bargain collectively. This, of course, is a substantial obstacle because the public employee has gained little if he is merely
given the right to join organizations but stopped from bargaining
collectively.
Since this article is particularly concerned with the position of
the public school teacher, it seems important to state that in the
field of education there is often substituted for the term "collective
bargaining" the expression "professional negotiations." This writer
views these terms as synonymous. Professional negotiations merely
connotes that people of professional standing are participating and
does not convey a fundamentally different meaning than does collective bargaining. Throughout this discussion the term "collective
bargaining" will be used.
The argument in support of the attitude that the public employer should not be required to bargain collectively with public
employees can be briefly summarized as follows:
1. The fixing of conditions of work in the public service is a
legislative function.
2. Neither the executive nor the legislative body may delegate
such functions to an outside group.
3. The legislature or executive must be free to change the con4
ditions of employment at any time.
In relation to teachers and school boards the basic objection to
collective bargaining is probably most frequently expressed in the
contention that negotiations and collective bargaining constitute a
2

3

4

Perez v. Board of Police Comm'rs., 78 Cal. App. 2d 638, 178 P. 2d 537 (1947);
People ex rel Fursman v. City of Chicago, 278 Ill. 318, 116 N.E. 158 (1917);
King v. Priest, 357 Mo. 68, 206 S.W. 2d 547 (1947).
Mugford v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 185 Md. 206, 44 A, 2d 745
(1945); City of Cleveland v. Division 268, Amalgamated Assoc. of Street
Electric and Motor Coach Employees of Amer., 30 Ohio Op. 395 (1945);
Mutter v. Santa Monica, 74 Cal. App. 2d 292, 168 P. 2d 741 (1946) ; Springfield
v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W. 2d 539 (1947) ; Miami Water Works, Local
No. 654 v. Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 26 So. 2d 194 (1946) ; Wagner v. Milwaukee,
177 Wis. 410, 188 N.W. 487 (1922); C.I.O. v. City of Dallas, 198 S.W. 2d 143
(Tex. 1946); Wichita Public Schools Employees Union, Local 513 v. Smith,
397 P. 2d 357 (Kan. 1964) ; Dade County v. Amalgamated Ass'n. of Street
Electric Railroad and Motor Company Employees, 157 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 1963).
ABA, 1958 PROCEEDINGS OF SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS LAW, Report of the
Committee on State Labor Legislation 128, 147.
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serious invasion of school board authority. Those who make such
objection take cognizance of certain general claims as to the meaning of the term negotiations and collective bargaining. These general claims are:
1. Collective bargaining legally requires something much different than merely providing groups an opportunity to appear
before or in some fashion to present their requests to a school
board-a technique that has been quite widely sanctioned for
many years.
2. The concept does not permit the school board complete discretion as to what procedure to follow in reacting to requests
that may be presented by teachers.
3. The concept requires the school board to react to requests
from a certified representative of employes by discussing proposals and giving reasons for modification or rejection of demands.
4. The concept often requires counterproposals.
In order to react to the validity of the assertion that such a general concept of collective bargaining does constitute a serious invasion of school board authority, it seems necessary to delineate fully
what is legally meant by collective bargaining. The concept of what
constitutes good faith collective bargaining has been worked out to
a large extent by the federal courts and the National Labor Relations Board in interpreting Section 8 (d) of the National Labor Relations Act,5 which by its specific language imposes a duty on employers and unions to "meet at reasonable times and confer in good
faith with respect to wages, hours and other terms and conditions
of employment" and goes on to state "such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession."
It is possible that if state statutory language differs from that of
the National Labor Relations Act, there could be an interpretation
of good faith bargaining somewhat different than the description
which follows. It seems certain, however, that no state legislation
calling for negotiating will require by way of bargaining approach
more than does the National Labor Relations Act and the decisions
interpreting the responsibilities imposed by the Act. It is submitted
that the guide lines laid down by the National Labor Relations
Board and the Federal courts establish a valid concept of good faith
collective bargaining. Indeed those who indulge in voluntary bargaining may very well want to follow much the same pattern.
Good faith bargaining often does require the reacting to demands that are not acceptable by offering the reasons for rejection
5 29 U.S.C.A. §§141 et seg.
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and some counter-proposals. 6 It requires recognition by both parties,
not merely formal but real, that collective bargaining is a shared
process in which each party has a right to play an active role.7 In
this area there has been a rather recent interesting development. In
December 1964 the National Labor Relations Board in the General
Electric Company8 case dealt with what is familiarly known as the
Boulwarism 9 approach.
The fact situation showed that the employer listened to and analyzed the demands and arguments supplied by the Union and then
made an offer to the Union which included everything the employer
found to be warranted. Nothing was held back for later negotiations
and the company took the position that the offer would not be
changed unless new information or a significant development in
facts indicates that adjustments are warranted. The Company justified this position on the ground that it engaged in year-around research to determine what is right for the employees, and when bargaining begins, it listens to the Union as part of its overall research
and then on the basis of overall study makes an offer which includes
everything it believes is warranted. The Company does not actually
say "take it or leave it" but does make it clear it will not change its
position unless new information is presented. It made it clear it
would take a strike rather than do what it considers wrong policy.
The National Labor Relations Board condemned this type of
bargaining on the ground that it was tantamount to mere formality
and serves to transform the role of the employee representative from
a joint participant in the bargaining process to that of an adviser. In
practical effect the Board felt the position of the Company was akin
to that of a party who enters into negotiations with a pre-determined resolve not to budge from an initial position-an attitude inconsistent with good faith bargaining.' 0
In deciding the General Electric case the National Labor Relations Board also alluded to the fact that the Company mounted a
campaign of communications, both before and during negotiations,
for the purpose of disparaging and discrediting the Union and to
seek to persuade the employees to exert pressure on the Union to
submit to the will of the employer. The communications were referred to as reaching "flood" proportions. The Board felt this approach on the part of the employer overlooked the requirement of Na6 N.L.R.B. v. Pilling & Sons Co., 119 F. 2d 32 (3rd Cir. 1941); N.L.R.B. v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F. 2d 676 (9th Cir. 1943) ; Dierks Forests, Inc.
(N.L.R.B. Decision) 57 L.R.R.M. 1087, 1089 (1964).
7East Bay Union of Machinists, Local 1304 USW v. NLRB, 322 F. 2d 411, 415
(D.C. Cir. 1963).
8 57 L.R.R.M. 1491 (1964).
9 The name of an industrial relations executive at General Electric.
10 The General Electric case has reached the Federal Court of Appeals and is
likely ultimately to go to the United States Supreme Court.
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tional Labor Relations Board v. Insurance Agents International Union,
AFL-CIO"" that the statutory representative is the one with whom the
employer must deal in conducting bargaining negotiations and that
he can no longer bargain directly or individually with the employees.
Collective bargaining does not mean the necessity that the public employer must ultimately capitulate to demands.12 It does not
mean that there is a necessity to make some concessions as an outgrowth of every demand. 13 Good faith bargainingdoes not sanctiGn
an administrative body or a court undertaking to exercise its wisdom to determine if a particular proposal was reasonable or un4

reasonable.2

The United States Supreme Court' 5 in interpreting the meaning
of good faith collective bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act has recognized three categories of proposals:
1. Those that are illegal and therefore cannot be bargained about.
2. Those that may be bargained about if the parties voluntarily
wish to do so.
3. Those that are mandatory and must be bargained about.
Proposals that come within the category of wages, hours and
other terms and conditions of employment fall within the mandatory area. Certainly falling within conditions of employment would
be such things as assignments during out of school hours to supervision of extra-curricular events, class loads, class size, use of
teacher assistants and rest periods.
It would appear that decisions on curriculum content could technically be viewed as remaining solely the prerogative of administration and the school board. In this respect, however, it would seem
wise for the school board not to adopt a too literal approach. Many
employer leaders in industrial relations adopt the attitude that it is
not wise to be too technical about drawing the line on the ground
that the subject-matter does not fall within the mandatory area.
These leaders feel industrial peace will be best insured if the employer is willing to discuss most matters at the bargaining table. A
prominent School Board member adopts the same attitude. 16 Of
course those who share this attitude realize that bargaining does
not mean capitulation.
11361 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1960).
12 N.L.R.B. v. American National Insurance Co., 343 U.S. 395, 72 Sup. Ct. 824
(1952).

3White v. N.L.R.B., 255 F. 2d 564 (5th Cir. 1958); N.L.R.B. v. American Aggregate Co., 335 F. 2d 253 (5th Cir. 1964).
14 Id at 466-67; Diercks Forest, Inc., supra note 6.
15 N.L.R.B. v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 78 Sup. Ct.
718 (1958).
Is Story in Theory Into Practice,Vol. IV, No. 2, p. 61 (1965). Published by Ohio
State University.
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It is very significant that the United States Supreme Court recognized that a party cannot be forced to bargain on certain matters
that are illegal. This principle answers objections of those who
attempt to argue that public employee bargaining is blocked by
statutes which may exact budget limitations, by such things as
state salary laws and by state tenure, retirement and pension laws.
The principle recognizes that it would be improper to ignore the
problem of public employee bargaining colliding with existing
statutes. This recognition, however, requires a realistic appreciation of what it means to collide with the statute. For example, even
if there is a state tenure law setting forth reasons for "for cause"
discharge, it would still be possible to bargain for intermediate
grievance procedure.
In facing up to whether there has been good faith bargaining, It
needs be recognized that it is necessary to evaluate the facts. This
can be difficult because it requires an objective evaluation of the
parties' attitude as reflected in their course of conduct during negotiation. In this area it is significant to take account of the National
Labor Relations Board language in the General Electric case.'7 The
Board commented that "in challenging the trial examiner's finding
... General Electric argues that an employer cannot be found guilty
of having violated its statutory duty where it is desirous of entering into a collective bargaining agreement, where it has met and
conferred with the bargaining representative on all required subjects of bargaining as prescribed by statute and has not taken unlawful unilateral action, and where it has not demanded the inclusion in the bargaining contract of any illegal clauses or insisted to
an impasse upon any non-mandatory bargaining provision. In compliance with the above General Electric further argues that an employer's
technique of bargaining is not subject to approval or disapproval by
the Board." To this argument the Board responded, "General Electric reads the statute requirement for bargaining collectively too
narrowly . . . An employer may still have failed to discharge its

statutory obligation to bargain in good faith. As the Supreme Court
has said,' 8 'The Board is authorized to order the secession of behavior which is in effect a refusal to negotiate, or which directly
obstructs or inhibits the actual process of discussion, or which reflects a cast of mind against reaching an agreement'

. . .

Good faith

bargaining thus involves both a procedure for meeting and negotiating, which might be called the externals of collective bargaining,
and a bona fide intention, the presence or absence of which must be
discerned from the record."
1 Supra note 8 at 1499.
Is N.L.R.B. v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 747 (1962).
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In connection with this statement it is significant to note the
comments of the Chairman of the National Labor Relations Board.'1
He states: "The decision does not hold that an employer may not
after appropriate bargaining make a fair and final offer to the Union
representing his employees. It does not hold an employer may not
criticize union leaders or proposals. It does not hold that an employer may not communicate with his employees. Those who tell
you differently do you a disservice. The Board simply applied accepted principles to a unique bargaining situation."
In connection with the evaluation of good faith, certain types of
conduct have been held to be sufficient of themselves to establish
a lack of good faith bargaining. A refusal to discuss or provide data
necessary to intelligent discussion of a subject within the mandatory area of bargaining is an example. 20 So also has insistence upon
including in a contract a proposal that is outside the scope of man21
datory bargaining.
An appreciation of the principles set forth helps to give realistic
meaning to the term good faith collective bargaining and has convinced certain courts and legislative bodies that permitting public
school employees to bargain collectively does not invade school
board authority. Essentially this is because even though collective
bargaining does place certain responsibilities upon the employer,
there is nothing in the principle stated which forces capitulation to
demands. It does not, therefore, appear accurate to assert that
school boards are forced to delegate away authority. Furthermore,
the situation is such that the employer representatives at the bargaining sessions must seek ratification of the Board of Education.
This is no different than in the case of industry representatives as
respects their Board of Directors.
It is, of course, apparent that when the school board undertakes
collective bargaining, as it has been defined, it undertakes burdens
which it does not need to assume if it does not bargain collectively.
The assumption, however, of these burdens does not mean that the
board has delegated away its authority. In this respect it is interesting to recall that the history of industrial relations establishes
that when the employer was first confronted with the statutory
necessity of bargaining collectively, he complained that he was being forced to delegate away his authority. The courts did not agree
with him. The courts recognized that he did assume additional bur19 McCulloch, Address delivered Oct. 28, 1965 at the annual meeting of Texas
Industry, reported in 60 L.R.R.M. 145.
20 Matter of Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 76 Sup. Ct. 753 (1956); N.L.R.B. v.
Item Co., 220 F. 2d 956 (5th Cir. 1955).
21 Allen Bradley Co. and Lodge No. 78, Tool and Die Makers International Assoc.,
45 L.R.R.M. 1505, 127 N.L.R.B. No. 8 (1960).
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dens but that he still retained ultimate authority to make final decisions.
In the public employee field if legislative bodies decree or courts
permit collective bargaining, it represents a decision, just as it did
in the industrial field, that employee relations will be benefited. It
does not appear that this decision can be logically frustrated by the
argument that the provision results in forcing a school board to
delegate away its authority.
It is now appropriate to turn attention to the examination of
the existing status of public employee collective bargaining at the
state level.
A number of states, either by judicial decision or by statute, are
showing an awareness of the realities of the situation and an understanding of what collective bargaining really means and are not
influenced by the arguments previously summarized as to why collective bargaining on the part of public employees should be treated
as illegal.
Some states by judicial decision-entirely independent of supporting state statues-have approved collective bargaining if two
conditions exist:
1. The parties enter into it voluntarily.
2. There is no prohibitory state statute.
The leading case exhibiting this philosophy is the 1951 Connecticut Supreme Court decision of Norwalk Teachers Association v.
22

Board of Education.

Some jurisdictions 3 have not been content with the possibility
that collective bargaining will be initiated through voluntary agreement as sanctioned by judicial decision. These states have passed
statutes sanctioning and indeed requiring collective bargaining and
in many instances laid down rather specific ground rules. The State
of Wisconsin 24 furnishes perhaps the best and most comprehensive
example of a statute of such type.
The statute gives the covered employees the right to join labor
organizations and to be represented by such organizations in conferences and negotiations with their employers or their representatives on questions of wages, hours and conditions of employment.
Conn. 269, 83 A. 2d 482 (1951) ; Civil Service Forum v. New York City
Transit Authority, 163 N.Y.S. 2d 476, 4 App. Div. 2d 117 (1957); aff'd 4 N.Y.
2d 866, 150 N.E. 2d 705, 174 N.Y.S. 2d 234 (1958). Local 266, International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District, 78 Ariz. 30, 275 P. 2d 393 (1954) ; Los Angeles
Metopolitan Transit Authority v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 54 Cal. 2d
684, 355 P. 2d 905 (1960).
23
ALASKA LAWS 1959, Ch. 108; MASS. ANN. LAWS 40, §46 (1960) ; MINN. STAT.
ANN. §179.52 (Supp. 1960); NH REV. STAT. ANN. §31.13 (1956); ILL. ANN.

22138

Ch. 127, §63b109(7) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1960); FLA.
(1959) ; R.I. GEN. LAW, §§36-11-1-36-11-5 (Supp. 1959).

STAT.,

24 MWiS. STATS. ANN.

§111.70

STAT.

§839.22(1)
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The employees also have the right to refrain from any and all such
activities. The statute prohibits municipal employers or employees
from interfering with the rights granted by the legislation through
discrimination in regard to hire, tenure or other terms or conditions
of employment.
The Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, which is authorized to administer, the statute, has made it clear that any employee
organization whose purpose is to represent municipal employees in
conferences and negotiations with their employer on questions of
wages, hours and conditions of employment is considered a labor
organization regardless of what name the employees may use to
describe their organization. For example, a local teacher association
affiliated with the Wisconsin Education Association has been considered a labor organization for the purpose of the statute.
Under specific provisions of the statute the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board passes upon questions of representation and
is empowered to enforce the prohibited practice section. Final orders
of the Board are subject to judicial review.
The statute empowers the WERB to hold elections and determine questions of representation. The Act excludes crafts from any
unit that the municipal employees may select. The WERB has determined that the term "craft" includes professional employees such
as teachers. Therefore, teachers are assured of being in a separate
unit. In respect to a craft the law provides that the Board shall not
order an election among employees in a craft unit except upon
separate petition initiating representation proceedings in such craft
unit.
The Board has further determined that supervisors are agents of
the municipal employer within the meaning of the statute and,
therefore, cannot be included in the same collective bargaining unit
with other employees. This determination has been made even
though the statute does not specifically exclude supervisory employees
from the definition of employees. The reasoning has been that the inclusion of supervisory employees in the same bargaining unit as
the employees whom they supervise would conflict with the supervisors' responsibility in performing their management function and
would, therefore, tend to interfere with protected rights of employees to organize and to be represented by organizations of their
own choosing. In spite of this attitude, however, the Board has held
that mere membership of supervisors in a labor organization is not
prohibited by the statute. The Board has decreed that the ratio of
their membership and the question as to whether supervisors hold
an office or participate in the formulation of the bargaining policies
and programs of the labor organization is the really significant
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factor in determining whether such labor organization was dominated by the employer.
In the industrial and business field exclusive bargaining has become a way of life. Experts from both management and labor concede that it is not practical to expect an employer to bargain with
any but the union that represents the majority of the employees in
an appropriate unit. In the public employee field, however, the objection has been made that there is something unconstitutional
about providing for exclusive bargaining on the ground that every
citizen has a right to petition his government.
Although there have been some technical arguments to the effect
that the Wisconsin Statute did not provide for exclusive bargaining with the organization held to represent the majority in an appropriate unit the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board has interpreted Section 111.70(4) (d) of the Act as so providing. The Tv'ilwaukee School Board 25 and other municipal employers have accepted such interpretation as the state of the law and there has been
no effort to upset the position by judicial decision. The Wisconsin
law does, however, provide that any individual employee in any
collective bargaining unit shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer in person or through representatives of their own choosing. This proviso answers the objection of
those who assert that there is something unconstitutional about
providing for exclusive bargaining in the public employee field. By
permitting the presentation of grievances by an individual or minority the Wisconsin Act sets up a technique which will enable the
employer to learn certain facts which it may want to use when it
bargains with the majority and citizens and minority groups are
not denied the right to petition their government.
From the factual standpoint the indications are that almost all
municipal employers clearly desire to bargain on an exclusive basis
with the organization that has been selected as the representative
of the majority.
In an effort to take care of a bargaining impasse or refusal to
negotiate the Wisconsin Statute introduced a provision for factfinding. If an employer or a union fails or refuses to meet or negotiate in good faith at reasonable times in a bona fide effort to arrive
at settlement or if after a reasonable period of negotiations the
parties are deadlocked, the WERB is empowered to appoint a fact
finder when it is satisfied that a deadlock exists. The fact finder is
authorized to hold hearings and must make written findings and
recommendations which are to be made public. The fact finder has
no power to enforce his recommendations. The WERB has held
25 Supra, note 16.
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that the statute does not impose any limitations on
tions for the solution of the dispute. The Board has
imply a prohibition against making recommendations
in the future would hamstring and nullify the fact
dure.

' 28

recommendasaid "that to
to be applied
finding proce-

The hope is that the promulgation of recommendations will

enlist the support of public opinion in finding a solution. The cost of
fact finding is to be shared by the parties.
The WERB is directed not to initiate fact-finding proceedings
in any case when the municipal employer, through ordinance or
otherwise, has established fact finding techniques substantially in
compliance with the statute.
Collective bargaining has as an end product the objective of an
employer-employee contract. The Federal law recognizes this. The
Wisconsin Statute specifically states that upon the completion of
negotiations with an employee organization representing a majority
of the employees in a collective unit if a settlement is reached, the
employer shall reduce the same to writing either in the form of an
ordinance, resolution or agreement. It is stated that the term for
which a contract shall remain in effect shall not exceed one year.
Although it appears that the Wisconsin Statute pertaining to
public employee bargaining is the most comprehensive to date
there is other current legislation. Legislation particularly restricted
in operation to teachers was passed in 1965 in Connecticut, Oregon,
Washington, and California.
The California provision which became effective in September
1965 is particularly interesting." The statute was passed for the
specific purpose of removing education personnel from the impact
of the Government Code which controlled general public employee
relations.
The history of the legislation reveals clearly that it does not require good faith bargaining as this article has defined it. It does require a governing Board or such administrative officer as the Board
may designate to meet and confer with representatives of employee
organizations upon request with regard to all matters relating to
employment conditions and employer-employee relations . . . all

matters relating to the definition of educational objectives, the determination of the context of courses and curricula, the selection of
text books and other aspects of the instructional program to the
extent such matters are within the discretion of the Board.
The California statute makes clear that it does not adopt the
theory of bargaining with an exclusive representative. The Act says
that "in the event there is more than one employee organization
26 City of Racine, Dec. No. 6242A (1963).
27
Amendment to 3501 of Government Code and Addition Art. 5 (commencing
with §13080) to Chap. 1 of Division 10 of Part 2 of Education Code.
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representing certified employees, the public school employer . . .
shall meet and confer with the representatives of such employee
organizations through a negotiating council ... provided that nothing herein shall prohibit any employee from appearing in his own
behalf. . ." It is provided that "the negotiating council shall have
not more than nine nor less than five members and shall be composed of representatives of those employee organizations who are
entitled to representation on the negotiating council. An employee
organization representing certified employees shall be entitled to
appoint such number of members of the negotiating council as bears
as nearly as practicable the same ratio to the total number of members of the negotiating council as the number of members of the
employee organization bears to the total number of certified employees of the public school employer who are members of the employee organizations representing certified employees."
The Connecticut Statute2 has some interesting provisions. It
expressly recognizes that a bargaining unit may be appropriate
which includes supervisory (other than the superintendent) and
non-supervisory employees. Or there may be two separate unitsone for all employees in positions requiring a teaching certificate
and the other for all employees in positions requiring a supervisory
certificate. The legislation provides that when 20% of either the
teaching or supervisory employees file a petition with the state
commissioner of education for separate representation separate
units will be set up. The representative selected is to be the exclusive representative in the unit with a proviso similar to that in
Wisconsin as to the right of individual employees to present grievances. The statute sets up a technique for determining the question
of representation.
The Michigan Act 29 applies to all public employees. It authorizes
the Michigan Labor Mediation Board to determine the appropriate
unit and to conduct a representation election. It requires public employers to negotiate in good faith with the designated exclusive
representative on "rates of pay, wages, hours of employment or
other conditions of employment."
The existence of a statute in the field of public employee bargaining is of major significance. As has been indicated, courts may
sanction voluntary bargaining in the absence of statute but this
will not always insure the desired result. For instance, a statute can
spell out election procedure to be used in the determination of a
majority representative in an appropriate unit. It can make clear
that bargaining is to be on an exclusive basis with the organization
28

Public Law 298 (1965).

29 Public Law 379 (1965).
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that represents the majority of the employees in an appropriate
unit. It can express other intents. If there is no statute, whatever
attempts are made at bargaining may break down in arguments
over procedure and over such questions as exclusive representation.
Since the Wisconsin Statute was used as an example, it perhaps should be said that the statute does present some language
which has resulted in arguments as to intent of meaning. There
will undoubtedly be amendments by way of clarification and additions. In the field of public employee bargaining-still somewhat
of an experimental area-it may in some jurisdictions be difficult
to pass a statute which is a model of clarity. Most statutory efforts,
however, will produce a better result than to depend upon voluntary
arrangement if the community feels that employee relations will be
fostered by stimulating collective bargaining.
In some states, 30 including Wisconsin, there is a provision aimed
at assisting in connection with negotiations between the public employer and employees. It is the provision for mediation when such
help is requested by both parties. In Wisconsin when such request
is made, the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board may function.
There are a number of additional matters that merit discussion
if public employee bargaining is approved in a particular jurisdiction either by judicial decision or through legislation.
One is the question of whether a public employer can enter into
a Union Security Agreement with a majority union requiring that
all employees in an appropriate unit must within a set period of
time after employment (commonly thirty days) join the Union
which is recognized as representing the employees in the appropriate unit. Unless outlawed by right to work laws, this term can be
incorporated and enforced in labor contracts and in industry. To
date there has been no decision which has sanctioned such a provision in the public employer-employee area. Indeed, a 1959 Montana case 3' has come out forcibly against the validity of the Union
Security Clause.
Two other questions are whether a negotiated contract could
provide for the agency shop or check-off of dues.
The agency shop is designed to meet the argument that no individual should be compelled to join a Union (and become subject
to its discipline) against his will as a condition of getting or keeping
30

Ch. 108; FLA. STAT. §839.22(1) (1959); ILL. STAT. ANN.,
Ch. 127, §63b109(7) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1960); MAss. ANN. LAws, Ch. 40,

ALASKA LAWS 1959,

§4c (1960); MIcH. Comp. LAws, §§423-201-423-208 (148); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§179.52 (Supp. 1960) ; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §31.3 (1955); N.D. LAws, Ch. 219
(1951); ORE. REv. STAT. §662 (1953); R.I. GEN. LAW §§36-11-1-36-11-5 (Supp.
1959) ; Wis. STATS. §11.70 (1959).
31 Benson et el. v. School District No. 1 of Silver Bow County, 136 Mont. 77, 344
P. 2d 117 (1959).
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a job, and the counter-argument for eliminating an employee who
is willing to accept the benefits of collective bargaining without paying his fair share of the cost of the bargaining process. 32 The opponents of the agency shop contend that it is unfair to require an
employee who is unwilling to join a union to pay money into its
treasury.
It would appear that if the legislature of a state so decreed,
language looking toward the permission to include a union shop
clause or check off of dues provision in a contract would be found
lawful in some jurisdictions. If the legislature did wish to grant
such permission, it would undoubtedly require a more than just
simple majority vote of the employees. Politically it might be quite
difficult to induce a legislature to sanction an agency shop clause
in a contract involving public employees. Certainly if the legislature was disposed to act in respect to approving the agency shop,
it should put up a barrier against money paid in by non-union men
being used for political or other purposes not germane to the collective bargaining process.
Even if legislatures did make the union shop, check-off dues
and agency shop permissive clauses in contracts in the public employee field, it seems reasonable to predict that many state courts
would find the provisions improper. It would be quite likely that
such courts would find applicable the basic philosophy that the
Montana Supreme Court33 expressed in dealing with the problem
of insertion of a Union Security Clause into a contract when no
statute existed. The Court concluded that agreements by the board
to hire only union members would be illegal discrimination. An
Ohio Court found a provision for check-off of dues invalid on the
reasoning that the laws of this state and the regulations of the civil
service commission cover fully all questions of wages, hours of
work and conditions of employment affecting civil service opportunities. There is, said the Court, no authority for delegation. 34
Another significant question is whether a negotiated contract
can provide for binding arbitration of grievances arising under a
contract. Many attacks on this kind of provision manifest a failure
to discern that the proposal is limited to the arbitration of grievances
arising under a contract. The assumption that induces many to object appears to be that an arbitration proposal involves calling in an
outsider to write a term into a contract if the parties cannot agree.
No one is presently seriously making such proposal.
32 For a review of the problem see the late Senator Taft's comments in Senate
Labor Committee Report, 80th Congress, First Session, Report No. 105, April
17, 1947.
33 Supra, note 31.
34 Hagerman v. Dayton, 147 Ohio St. 313, 71 N.E. 2d 246 (1947).
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Numerous courts, however, have given consideration to the
matter of arbitration of grievances under a contract. Those who
oppose the clause as invalid reason that it constitutes a complete
abdication of school board authority. The Ohio 35 Court, for ex-

ample, has indicated that it would be a vain and futile thing for a
board to refer issues to an arbitrator who with the best intentions
might make an award which because of conflicting statutes it would
be legally impossible for the board to accept.
This is essentially the same argument outlined in this article
in connection with some objections that have been made to collective bargaining. In facing up to the argument it was pointed out
that it is always necessary in the field of public employee bargaining to be aware of the problem of colliding with statutes. So, too,
in the arbitration area it is obvious that an arbitrator could not
render a binding decision which would collide with some existing
statutes. Some statutes would, indeed, stand as a barrier against referring matters to an arbitrator. For example, if a tenure statute
specifically sets up the procedure in respect to discharge for cause,
the statute must be followed and the matter cannot simply be referred to an arbitrator.
A recently signed contract between a union and the City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, furnishes an illustration of what can be done
to avoid conflict with statutes by way of providing for arbitration
in a labor agreement. 3 In Milwaukee the law imposes responsibility
on the Civil Service Commission to decide disciplinary disputes.
The labor contract, therefore, makes provision that such disputes
will be referred to an arbitrator for an advisory opinion. This opinion will be sent to the Civil Service Commission for ultimate decision. Under the contract the Civil Service Commission is still allowed sole authority to arbitrate grievances on promotion and job
evaluation. Disputes on seniority rights and the application of the
contract's terms on wages, hours and working conditions are to be
referred to binding arbitration. The arbitrator is to be selected from
a panel supplied by the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board.
The New York City Board of Education agreement with its
teachers-perhaps the most comprehensive teacher contract that
has been negotiated to date-shows a voluntary effort to incorporate the kind of arbitration clause that is legal. Under the New York
contract the recourse to an arbitrator is available only for grievances involving the application or interpretation of the agreement.
35 City of Cleveland v. Div. 268, Amalgamated Assoc. of Street Electric and Motor
Coach Employees of Amer., 30 Ohio Op. 395 (1945).

36 Although the Wisconsin Statute makes no provision for introducing an arbitra-

tion clause into any agreement that may be reached, the legality of such provision is supported by City of Madison v. Frank Lloyd Wright Foundation, 20
Wis. 2d 361, 122 N.W. 2d 409 (1963).
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The arbitrator is specifically prohibited from making any decision
which is contrary to or inconsistent with the terms of the agreement or which involves the exercise of discretion by the Board or
limits or interferes in any way with the powers, duties and responsibilities of the Board under law. It is quite obvious that the arbitrator is not put in a position to write in contractual terms.
Indeed a recent decision of an arbitrator under the New York
City contract reveals one individual3 attitude as to just how narrow
the arbitration power can be viewed. 7
Under the grievance procedure provided in the New York contract the Superintendent of Schools in step 3 ruled that a teacher by
reason of terms in the contract was entitled to a duty free lunch
period "at the earliest possible date." The teacher brought the matter to arbitration on the ground that the Superintendent's decision
did not provide him and "other employees similarly situated" with
compensatory time off equivalent to the amount of duty free lunch
time that they failed to receive during approximately 36 weeks of
the 1963-64 school year.
Both parties requested the arbitrator to limit his decision 'in the
first instance to the arbitrability of the narrow issue presented by
the teacher; that is, the right to compensatory time off.
The decision was that the question as presented was not arbitrable.
The reasoning of the arbitrator was as follows: The history of
negotiations showed that the independent opinion of an arbitrator
was to be sought only as to the meaning of the agreement's substantive provisions regarding working conditions. (In other words
it did not envision award of a remedy which would cost money.)
It was felt that the arbitrator could not make an award which
would cost money because the Education Law in New York clearly
showed that the Board could not delegate its responsibility for use
of available funds. The arbitrator also commented that the Education Law dictated that the Board could not delegate its authority as
regards extent of needed instruction.
The decision stated that an arbitrator cannot intrude upon important areas of the Board's "discretion" and "policy making" function as set forth in Education Law. If the legislature had intended to
make it possible for arbitrator to substitute his judgment in such
areas it could have and would have made such intent clear, the arbitrator reasoned.
3 Board of Education of City of N.Y. and United Federation of Teachers, 44 LA
929 (1965).
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The arbitrator talked about compensatory time off adding up to
as much as $7,000,000 to $8,000,000 or a school closing of approximately 12 days. It is surely obvious that this had an affect on the
arbitrator although he states that potential liability makes no difference. He said that even if it were $10 "the basic conclusion must
be and is that the Board cannot delegate to the arbitrator its responsibility for determining how to allocate its funds."
This attitude it needs be repeated is because of the way the arbitrator read the New York Education Law Section 2554(9), 2576(5)
and 2576(7).
The arbitrator took occasion to warn that even if the Education
Law did not stand in the way of the arbitrator a contract would
have to be very clear as to intent before the arbitrator could disburse funds by way of remedy.
After concluding as he did the arbitrator undertook to set forth
some observations. He felt that there was still merit in the arbitration provisions in the New York contract. He said "in the present
situation the Union has been able to achieve significant gains in
connection with the resolution of grievances in that under Article
VI (which deals with grievance procedure and arbitration) of the
contract the Board has committed itself to arbitration of a broad
range of substantive issues that may arise concerning working conditions ,especially since supervisors are understandably reluctant
to be brought to the attention of those in authority above them on
charges of unfairness to teachers under them."
The arbitrator went on to say: "A large complex educational
system inevitably lends itself to situations where there may be an
abuse of power by those in supervisory positions. The recognition
of this possibility by the Board and the Union with their resultant
agreement on the beneficial provisions of Article VI is an important
step forward in the area of improving working conditions and undoubtedly has an influence on those in direct authority with recognition by them of the contractual rights as well as the dignity and respect due a person who as a result of years of preparation has attained professional status."
In view of such observation it should be remembered that in the
arbitration matter just discussed in step 3 of the grievance the
teacher received a ruling that she was to be given duty free lunch
periods "at the earliest possible date." It was not too long after
such decision that additional personnel were assigned to the school
and duty free lunch periods were provided.
All that the arbitrator concluded was that he had no jurisdiction to award compensatory time off to make whole for free time
lost in the past.
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The Norwalk case exhibits judicial approval of an arbitration
clause.

38

No discussion concerning the right of teachers to engage in collective bargaining ought to terminate without some mention of the
legality of public employee use of certain concerted activities intended to exert pressure on school boards with the objective of attaining certain contract goals.
The activity that suggests itself for analysis in the first instance
is the right to strike. In the field of industrial relations the right is
largely preserved by statutes and courts. In the field of government
the right has been found not to exist. To date the judicial attitude
in this respect is uniform. All courts and authorities39 agree that the
right does not exist. The philosophy which supports the conclusion
has been variously expressed. The Attorney General of Minnesota
told the Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota that
"should we accept the doctrine permitting strikes, we would in effect transfer to such employees all legislative, executive and judicial
powers now vested in the duly elected public officers." Woodrow
Wilson called strikes by public employees "an interminable crime
against civilization." 40 The Norwalk41 case quotes Franklin D. Roosevelt, whom it identifies as certainly no enemy of labor, as saying,
"A strike of public employees manifests nothing less than an intent
on their part to prevent or obstruct the operation of government,
and such action is unthinkable and interminable." Norwalk goes on
to say, "Under our system, the government is established by and
run for all the people, not for the benefit of any person or group.
The profit motive is absent. It should be the aim of every employee
of the government to do his or her part to make it function as efficiently and economically as possible. The drastic remedy of the
organized strike to enforce the demands of a union of government
employees is in direct contravention of this principle."
As far as striking against school boards is concerned, there is an
additional good argument. Teachers cannot forget that they work
in a delicate area where it is of the utmost importance that young
people be encouraged to respect the legitimate authority of school
personnel. It is submitted that teachers risk such respect when they
go on strike. Even granted that sometimes they may have a very
good cause, it appears that immature young people in school may
not be able to appreciate the fact and may very likely feel that auth38138 Conn. 269, 83 A. 2d 482 (1951).
39 For a summary of authorities see Seasongood and Barry, Unionization of Public
Employees, 21 U. Cimc. L. REV. 327 (1952). Also see Ryne, Labor Unions and
Municipal Employee Law.
40 These attitudes are quoted by Vogel in What About the Right of the Public
Employee, 1 LAB. L.J. 604 (1950).
41 Supra, note 31.
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ority has been flaunted. Certainly it seems very disconcerting when
teachers and teachers' unions openly defy existing law and assert
that regardless of the law, they will strike.
It would seem that teacher picketing of the schools may have very
much the same effect on young minds as the strike effort. Although the
courts have continued to recognize that there is much free speech in
picketing, they have also clearly acknowledged that picketing contains
elements other than free speech. It may very well be, therefore, that a
state by statute may adopt a policy against picketing of schools by teachers. If such policy is enunciated, courts could very well sustain the
statute.
Those who argue that teachers should have a right to strike assert
basically that without the right, teachers have no realistic way of advancing their cause against an adamant school board. They further
contend that the general language condemning strikes on the part of
public employees should not be applied to all employees but that the
decision should be realistically grounded on the emergency created.
Those who make this argument would grant that police and firemen
should have no right to strike but they would, for example, not give
the same support to a law forbidding street maintenance employees
from striking. Even on the assumption that there might be some merit
in such distinctions, it is by no means clear that courts would or should
conclude that teachers have the right to strike. It does not seem unrealistic to recognize extreme interference with public welfare when
the education of a child is affected by the absence of teachers from the
classroom.
In connection with the effect that striking and picketing may have
upon children it is interesting to note the recent language of George
Watson, former long time State Superintendent of Public Instruction
in the State of Wisconsin. The Milwaukee Journal and Sentinel in the
Spring of 1965 quote him as saying about picketing on behalf of civil
rights in alleged de facto segregation situations, "School children should
not be used as weapons in philosophical or political disputes and given
dramatic examples of law violation. Education based on law violation
is poor education." If the language is applicable to civil rights endeavors
it is surely also applicable to similar pressure on behalf of wages, hours
and conditions of employment where the state of the law outlaws strikes.
While it is true that school children are not likely to be on picket lines
in support of a teacher strike, the children are given an example of
teachers ignoring the law prohibiting strikes.
The fact finding process provided in the Wisconsin Statute previously described is designed to give public employees help in lieu of the
right to strike. It must be remembered, however, that the fact finder
under the Wisconsin Statute has no power to enforce his decision. Fact
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finding is grounded upon the hope that the sympathy of public opinion
will be enlisted behind a fact finding conclusion.
It will be necessary to wait for experience under the Wisconsin
Statute to determine if public opinion will so respond when a response
to a fact finding holding may require an increase in taxes. The answer
will not always appear as a result of action taken immediately after a
fact finding decision has been rendered. Current budget problems may
force postponement of implementation of a fact finding decision. Ultimately, however, information can be gathered on the efficacy of fact
finding decisions.
If it should be finally discovered that the fact finding is not in reality
influencing public opinion and in turn inducing a change in the position
of the public employer or a union, the fact finding is really not much of a
substitute for the right to strike. If this were found to be the result, the
writer suggests the possibility of further experimentation with the fact
finding process. If fact finding is not implemented at the local level,
provision could be made for the decision to be reviewed by an impartial
out-of-state fact finding board made up of a leading professional educator, a civic leader and impartial chairman. Provision could be made to
permit teacher strikes if the review fact finding body supported the
initial findings and the board remained adamant. If this happened, it
would appear that school personnel ought to be able to convince pupils
and the general public that such a strike does not flaunt legitimate law
and authority.
There presently remains the question as to whether, other than fact
finding, there is any effective pressure that teachers can use in place of
the strike. The National Education Association has proposed sanctions.
Under this suggestion teacher organizations encourage teachers not to
return a signed contract and advise teachers not to accept jobs in the
area. It is true that if effective sanctions have the same result as a strike
in the sense that teachers are not in the classrooms. The great difference,
however, is that teachers are not leaving their posts during a contract
term.
It is hard to find any illegality in the sanction which is sparked only
by an appeal to teachers not to sign contracts or take jobs in an area.
This sort of appeal is surely free speech and the individual certainly
has a constitutional right to determine if he will work. Illegality would
appear only if the organization induced some kind of boycott pressure
which resulted in teachers who did not heed the call to sanction losing
job opportunities.
In spite of the fact that strikes by public employees and teachers are
held to be illegal, they have occurred and are likely to take place again.
From a purely practical viewpoint teachers en masse cannot be discharged even though their conduct is treated as illegal. Efforts have
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been made to attack the strike problem. One is to aim legislation at
the union treasury if the union calls the strike. Another approach is
42
to pass legislation similar to the Condon-Wadlin Law in New York.
Under 1963 amendments to the New York Act provision was made for
penalties against those who strike in the form of no salary increases
for six months, probation with loss of tenure for one year and salary
deduction to twice the daily compensation. Prior to the time the amendments were passed, harsher penalties in the New York law were not
enforced. The amended Act was to remain in effect until July 1, 1965.
Any taxpayer could initiate the action. The amendments have expired
and the law has reverted to the harsher Condon-Wadlin penalties.
A complete analysis of experience under the Condon-Wadlin Act
is presented in a recent issue of ILR RESEARCH 43 published by the
New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations of Cornell
University, New York. The author concludes that the Act has been used
upstate to stop strikes but asserts this is probably because of the lack
of politically powerful employee organizations in the areas. The facts,
it is stated, indicate that the act has never been fully invoked against a
large group .when that group was a strong union.
Since the amendments to Condon-Wadlin adopted on April 23, 1963,
there have been four strikes of public employees in New York City.
On January 31, 1965 the largest strike of public employees in New
York City's history was ended. After 28 days the striking welfare
workers, members of a Union, voted to accept the recommendation of
a citizen's committee appointed by Mayor Wagner. The major stumbling
block to settlement of the strike bad been the Condon-Wadlin Act and
the committee recommended that the city delay imposing penalties under
the Act until their constitutionality could be tested by the Unions.
In July 1964 the Act was invoked in New York City against a
one-day wildcat strike of 648 ferry worker members of National Maritime Union. The workers did sign waiver of three days pay-one day
for their absence from work and two days as a penalty under CondonWadlin. But, in spite of the fact that the Act provided that strikers
were not to receive pay increases for six months, the workers got an
immediate increase won by the Union of fifty cents an hour over a
three year period.
In August 1964 the New York City day camp teachers, members
UFT, staged a "mass resignation" for six days. They won salary increases and other benefits. It is not clear whether the Condon-Wadlin
Act was actually invoked. The Superintendent of Schools stated, "Since
42 See Pruzan et al. v. Board of Education, 209 N.Y.S. 2d 966 (1960) for a court

discussion involving the constitutionality of the Act.
4s Rosenzweig, The Condon-Wadlin Act Re-examined, ILR REsEARcH, Vol. XI,
No. 1, pp. 3-8 (1965).
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settlement has been reached I am sure that the Board of Education will
want to exercise every bit of leniency within the provisions of the law."
The 1965 New York City transit strike furnished another example
of a settlement without invocation of Condon Wadlin.
After analyzing the Condon-Wadlin experience, the author of the
article in ILR RESEARCH recommends repeal of the Act and passage
of the bill proposed in the 1962 Staff Report to the New York Joint
Legislative Committee on Industrial and Labor Conditions. Among the
recommendations are (1) Greater flexibility in penalties by replacing
the Condon-Wadlin penalties with those for misconduct as contained in
the State Civil Service Law, permitting choice between reprimand, fine
of not more than $100, suspension without pay for not more than two
months, demotion or dismissal. (2) Addition of a requirement that the
State Attorney seek an injunction immediately when the law has been
violated.
And most fundamental of all, the suggestion is made that the law
guarantee the right of public workers to join or not join employee
organizations, that there be provisions for collective dealing and grievance processing so that some of the causes of strikes will be eliminated
and that further there be provisions for mediation and binding arbitration of disputes arising under the collective agreement.
Another way of dealing with strikes is through clauses negotiated in the labor agreement. The contract could provide that a
strike called by the union would entitle the employer to recover specific
named damages. The contract could further provide that employees
taking part in an unauthorized strike would be subject to discharge or
loss of pay and certain benefits. In the case of such a strike the union
could be obligated to immediately order strikers back to work.
The most effective way of curbing strikes is for both parties to
strive to make collective bargaining work. Furthermore, many responsible leaders in the labor movement recognize that strikes in the field of
public employment are most often not in the public interest. There is
hope that these labor leaders will cooperate with public employers and
agree on the best way to prevent the public employee strike.
LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE

It seems appropriate by way of conclusion to make some comments
looking toward the future. In this respect it is logical to return directly
to thinking about the issue of public employee bargaining versus school
board authority. This article has had the intent of establishing that
school board authority will not be undermined just because collective
bargaining is decreed by law. It is submitted that the tide is running
in favor of giving public employees more bargaining rights. It does not
appear that the trend can be stopped for long by school boards. It seems
that boards will have no more success in this respect than the industrial
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employers of the 1930's who, as has been previously commented upon,
tried to halt the movement to give the laborer increased bargaining rights
with very much the same kind of arguments that some boards of education are using today. The principal contention was that of improper
delegation of authority.
It is submitted that boards of education might very well stop trying
to label provisions for collective bargaining illegal and turn their attention toward working out procedures which will make of public
employees bargaining something which is practical and expeditious.
There definitely are problems in the procedure area. Budget dates, for
example, suggest setting up an intelligent time table for bargaining.
Boards will undobutedly want to give consideraion to the question of
who should represent them at the bargaining table. The board will want
to face up to whether it might be unwise to have the superintendent the
constant negotiator. Some limitations on size of the bargaining teams
may be in order. If provisions are to be made for fact finding, the matter of consideration of time tables becomes even more necessary.
It is particularly important to consider the role of the Superintendent
of School. He holds the position of executive officer of the Board and is
also charged with providing professional leadership and administrative
direction to the teaching staff. He cannot avoid playing a key role in
negotiations but it does seem unwise to have the Superintendent personally participate at the bargaining table or elsewhere in the actual
mechanics of bargaining. Because of his intimate knowlede of all
aspects of administration, including budget making, he can give realistic
guidance to the bargaining committee. He should, however not be cast in
any role which would deter employees from candidly seeking his advice.
The composition of a bargaining committee seems all important.
Many school administrators assert that a Board of Education should
not be larger than 5 to 7 members. It has been further suggested by
some school administrators that if the Board is of such size the entire
body should sit at the bargaining table. This may work in communities
that are not too large and where the issues are not complex. It seems
that in larger communities, where problems tend to become more complex, the entire Board will not be able to contribute time to attend all
bargaining sessions. Then, too, some Boards are larger than 5 to 7
members. Certainly bargaining tends to become too unwieldly if a large
Board sits constantly during negotiations. If it is not feasible time wise
or size wise for the entire Board to sit throughout all bargaining sessions
it will be necessary to work out some kind of bargaining committee
arrangment whose membership may shift from time to time. The committee should seek the services of a negotiator skilled in collective bargaining and could very well include a lawyer experienced in the area
of employee relations.
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Discussions by some educators seem to indicate that there will be
no need for such specialists because unless bargaining is to take on
the nature of "horse trading" the Board and the employees should honestly exchange facts and arrive at decisions in very short order. It is
true that bargining should not be "horse trading." Even though it is
not it does, however, take time and expertise of high order to resolve
issues and positions honestly assumed by both sides of the bargaining
table. The experience of those who have acually participated in negotiating sessions induces this realistic conclusion. The bargaining committees
on both sides should have the benefit of advice of the specialists in substantive areas under consideration.
Most importantly there needs at all times to be realistic communication between any negotiating committee (if the full Board does not
sit) and the Board of Education.
A problem requiring the most careful thinking is the procedure relative to open bargaining sessions. It is unrealistic to carry on collective
bargaining entirely through open meetings. On the other hand in the
public employee field the people have a significant right to know. At
appropriate intervals the public must be given the position of the parties.
Many states have statutes requiring open meetings of governmental
bodies. Wisconsin is illustrative."' The Act provides that no formal
action of any kind shall be introduced, deliberated upon or adopted at
any closed executive session or closed meeting of any state and local
governing and administrative bodies. Certain exceptions are set forth.
A 19654' opinion of the Wisconsin Attorney General finds the exception
broad enough to cover the negotiations of a municipality and a labor
organization. However, it is made clear that the formal introduction,
deliberation and adoption by the elected body of the bargaining recommendations must be at open meetings.
For reasons indicated in the body of this article, it seems expeditious
to guide collective bargaining through specific statutory provisions. Collective bargaining is not an evil. There are, of course, legitimate pressures in collective bargaining. Although the pressure does not require
capitulation, it is intended to create an atmosphere which will insure a
give and take in the form of responses to demands and will often result
in counter-proposals and full explanations when demands are rejected.
This process is calculated to produce some sane and logical compromises.
By a succession of free choices each party determines the order of importance of his bargaining proposals. As these proposals are presented,
each party balances what is desired against known costs of unresolved
disagreement. These costs on the one side may be such things as loss
of competent employees and the fostering of a general low morale, and
44. VWAis. STATS. ANN.
45

August 19.

§14.90 (1959).
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on the other side the loss of community support if unreasonable demands
are made.
Finally, it seems important to draw to the attention of those school
boards that feel that collective bargaining means capitulation the philosophy expressed by the United States Supreme Court in a December
1964 decision.48 The Court clearly revealed that collective bargaining
does not connote capitulation and that it has a very important function.
The Court expressed the philosophy that, even though it is not possible
to say whether a satisfactory solution can be reached if bargaining takes
place the National Labor Policy is founded upon a determination that
the chances are good enough to warrant subjecting issues to the process
of collective bargaining.
If Boards of Education will engage in good faith collective bargaining and work out satsifactory procedures, there is every reason to believe
that there will be created a situation which will ultimately result in a
climate that will produce better education for children.
AUTHOR'S NOTE: In March 1966, after this article was written and set in type,
the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board enunciated a ruling of significance

by way of interpreting the duty to negotiate under Wisconsin Statute 111.70.
Two members of the WERB stated that the statute did not actually compel
negotiations. The philosophy supporting this viewpoint was that if the legislature
had intended to make negotiating compulsory it would have made failure to do
so an unfair labor practice. The WERB majority did stress, however, that if
the parties did fail to meet and negotiate in good faith the statute provides for
referring the matter to fact finding. Arvid Anderson, the dissenting member of
the WERB, argued most convincingly that the language of 111.70 clearly implied
a requirement to negotiate. The split on the WERB illustrates the need for care-

ful statutory drafting if it is the intent to impose upon the parties the requirement of good faith negotiations as that term has been delineated in this discussion.
In spite of the WERB attitude it would seem that most municipal employers
will continue to negotiate. In view of the basic intent of the Wisconsin Statute
it would appear that most employers would not desire to have a fact finder
present to public opinion his condemnation of an employer who refused to negotiate in good faith.
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Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 379 U.S. 203 (1964).

